In the 1970s and 1980s the United States and China developed cooperative relations to enhance security against the USSR. Conventional wisdom claims Washington and Beijing agreed to 'shelve' conflictual issues; where conflict occurred, diplomatic error or domestic politics are blamed. This book shows, however, that US-China cooperation was fragile precisely because of ongoing conflicts, notably that over Taiwan. The author disputes Kissinger's claim that only he and Nixon understood Taiwan's unimportance. China never found the US stance on Taiwan acceptable, and the issue required constant attention. The book shows how the two powers built cooperative relations despite Taiwan. It explains how negotiations were conducted, and why the two powers at times compromised and at times accepted the status quo. It examines why relations on occasion became acrimonious and why the acrimony subsided.
"A careful and rigorous examination of the factors that led the United States and China to 'negotiate cooperation' from 1969 to 1989. . . . Ross skillfully disentangles the web of considerations-above all, the common threat from the Soviet Union-that enabled negotiators to diffuse their hostility. The analysis is particularly useful for its sustained treatment of the delicate negotiations over Tai
Foreign Affairs
"A notable achievement in diplomatic history. . . . The author has covered a period of two decades without partisanship or sensationalism, and this could not have been an easy task. His book is destined to be the definitive account of its subject."
China Review International
"This authoritative and stimulating work is the best on the subject. It will serve two audiences: those wanting a narrative of U.S.-China relations and those seeking a deeper understanding of the dynamics of the relationship and its lessons for international politics. Whether dealing with grand strategy or diplomatic detail, Ross is masterly."
