Radomir Bogdanov, Deputy Director, Institute of the USA and Canada, 1983
"It was a matter of rather--I would say-greater danger than almost any other period in the Cold War, if only because the most-shall we say extreme-or hardline elements in the Soviet intelligence and military leadership might have at some point either misconstrued some developments in the West or chosen to act on the basis of evaluations that were greatly exaggerated. And that's why I think there was such great danger involved."
Dr. Raymond L. Garthof, specialist on arms control and intelligence
"in 1983, the Soviet military conducted its own exercise, Zapad [West] 83, which prepared (for the first time since the Second World War) for a situation where our armed forces obtained reliable data of an [an adversary's] decision made by highest military and political leadership to launch a surprise attack, using all possible firepower (artillery, aviation, etc.) against us. In response, we conducted offensive operations to disrupt the enemy attack and defeat its troops. That is, a preemptive strike."
General Valentin Ivanovich Varennikov, Soviet Deputy Chief of the General Staff
